Christopher Hopkins Joins Akerman Senterfitt

June 15th, 2010

Friends:

I am pleased to report that, effective Wednesday, June 16, I will be moving my law practice to Akerman Senterfitt LLP.  Both of Butzel Long’s Florida offices are being merged/absorbed into Akerman, the largest law firm in Florida (with 500+ lawyers nationwide).

You can check out the firm at www.akerman.com

My new contact information:

Christopher B. Hopkins

Akerman Senterfitt

222 Lakeview Avenue, Suite 400

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

Direct: 561-671-3668

Cell: 561-635-3397

Fax: 561-659-6313

Email: christopher.hopkins@akerman.com

Florida JEAC Opinion Allows Judicial Assistants to “Facebook Friend” Lawyers

June 8th, 2010

We previously mentioned the infamous? Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2009-20 which prohibits a judge from “friending” lawyers who appear before the court.  That’s so 2009.

The next logical question for judicial social networking policies has arrived: does this apply to the JA?

Yes, at least in part.  A judicial assistant can friend lawyers who appear before the court.  However, the limitations may devour the rule here.  The JA cannot post anything which makes “reference to the judge or the judge’s office…”  and the posts must be “outside of the judicial assistant’s responsibilities and independent of the judge…”  Given the frequency that people use Facebook at work (including listing where they work in their profile) and the amount of time we all spend at the office, those prohibitions seem fairly high.

JEAC Opinion 2010-04 goes on to note that any lawyer who attempts ex parte communication with the JA via social networking sites should have their head examined and should be de-friended and reported to the judge.

Florida Cruise Line Passengers & Forum Selection Clause in the Ticket

June 7th, 2010

The Third District has presented to the Florida Supreme Court a question of great public importance as it relates to the enforceability of forum selection clauses in cruise ship tickets. While the dissenting judge suggests that this is just a “garden variety personal injury case with a contractual twist,” the panel (based in Miami) likely recognized the significance of the cruise line industry in Miami-Dade and elsewhere in the state.

In Walter Weisenberg v. Costa Crociere (Cope, Shepherd and Suarez), the forum selection clause read:

For cruises which depart from, return to, or make any
port call at a United States port, Passenger further agrees
that any suit against CARRIER shall be filed exclusively
in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida located in Broward County, Florida,
and that any such suit shall be based exclusively upon the
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States District Court.

In short, it must be in federal court in Ft. Lauderdale and federal jurisdiction is conferred by admiralty law. The Plaintiff claimed that this was not sufficient notice of the need to file in federal court and that there would not be a jury. A prior case from last year, Leslie v. Carnival Cruise, involved a slightly different clause which did not require admiralty jurisdiction.

Question of GPI presented is:

IS A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE ENFORCEABLE
IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE ITS EFFECT IS
THAT PASSENGERS WAIVE THE RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL BUT THE CLAUSE DOES NOT
EXPRESSLY SO STATE?

Facebook Settings, Part II of…

June 1st, 2010

The increasingly long history of Facebook and privacy settings continues as users want an easy way to limit access to information on a system designed to exchange information (in fact, the reason it is free, after all, is because you pay with access to your information).  New changes are reportedly afoot (again).

Facebook is good for lawyers in the sense that accessible information about witnesses, opponents, and experts may be easy to find due to Facebook’s privacy settings.  On the flip side, like everyone else, lawyers want their own information nailed down.

The article, Facebook Privacy Settings, was published in the June 2010 Palm Beach Bar Association’s Bar Bulletin (also on the right column of the screen, under Articles).  Hope it helps.

New Opinions on Motion to Dismiss for Fraud Reveal That Evidentiary Hearing is Required

May 27th, 2010

We are fans of Florida Law Weekly as a reliable print and email source of new case law.  Volume 35, Number 20 (May 21, 2010) presents two cases involving Motions to Dismiss for Fraud, suggesting that (a) an evidentiary hearing is required and (b) the motion is limited in application.

In Dany Gilbert v. Eckerd Corporation of Florida, Inc., the Fourth District (Bowman, Farmer, and Hazouri) considered a personal injury case where the Plaintiff claimed lost wages in excess of $420k premised, in part, on a brief two month stint at a concrete company.  During discovery, however, the Plaintiff’s husband and several representatives of the company denied she worked there.  The Plaintiff, in turn, produced two checks and her tax returns.  In response, a representative of the company indicated that the money was for the Plaintiff’s husband and that the payment was for her to run through her business — not because she was an employee.

The Panel held that there was “no rule, statute or case” requiring an evidentiary hearing but that it was a “better practice” so the trial court could make specific findings.

In Ruby Hair v. Richard Morton, the Third District (Ramirez, Gersten, and Lagoa) held that inconsistencies, non-disclosures, and even falseness were better addressed in cross-examination and discovery sanctions than dismissal for fraud — and likewise determined that an evidentiary hearing was needed.

BOTH cases reversed the order of dismissal and noted (a) a motion to dismiss for fraud requires clear and convincing evidence, (b) dismissal for fraud is an “extreme” sanction, (c) proof required (clearly and convincingly) is that a party sentiently set in motion an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with justice, and (d) it must go to the core issues.

The Fourth DCA’s opinion suggested the standard of review is a “narrowed” abuse of discretion standard; the Third DCA indicated that, in the first place, trial courts should be granting these sparingly and cautiously.

Foursquare & Yelp for Lawyers

May 25th, 2010

Over the last several months, we’ve covered location-based Internet social networking sites, Foursquare and Yelp, as research and marketing tools for lawyers.

Special thanks to the Palm Beach Bar Association and co-author, Diana Martin, for running “Lawyer’s Guide to Foursquare & Yelp” in the May 2010 PBCBA Bar Bulletin.

For that article, you can follow the link or hit “2010 Foursquare & Yelp” under Articles on the right column.

The article was an idea which sprang from this prior February 2010 post, Foursquare & Yelp May Be New Research and Marketing Tools.  We emphasized the “marketing” part in a March post, Foursquare as a Promotional Tool for Law Business.

Florida Hurricane Damage Case: Homeowner Collects Under BOTH Flood and Wind Insurance Policies, No Set Off

May 24th, 2010

We are approaching hurricane season in Florida and with recent natural disasters firmly fixed in mind, this case may give some reassurance to homeowners — as long as your carriers do not “go FIGA.”

In Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Willis and Katherine Mathis (First DCA: Van Nortwick, Lewis and Rowe), Hurricane Ivan in 2004 caused damage to the Mathis’ home.  Flood water rose over four feet.  The Mathis family had flood and wind policies.  The flood carrier paid limits.  The windstorm carrier declined to give policy limits.  A suit and trial ensued with a jury finding a constructive or actual total loss warranting policy limits.  The carrier appealed, claiming they were entitled to set off the flood payment.

There is potentially a lot in this case for insurance coverage lawyers.  The bottom line, however, is that the First DCA held that the policies were separate and that the Florida Valued Policy Law (Florida Statute 627.702(1)) did not require set offs.  Thus, the Mathis were to receive $250k (flood) and $295k (wind) on their two story house which had an estimated value between $400-500,000.  Thus, and pardon the pun a homeowner can collect under two separate policies even if there is a “windfall.”

Legal Ethics CLE in West Palm Beach

May 20th, 2010

Thanks to those who attended the 2010 Florida Legal Ethics CLE hosted in West Palm Beach by Lorman.  If you missed it, the cd and manual are available here.

For attendees, or just those interested, the powerpoint linked under “Materials” on the right hand column.

Can a Florida Lawyer “Ghostwrite” Pleadings for a Pro Se Litigant

May 18th, 2010

Maybe, since it appears that New York lawyers, under a similar ethics rule, are permitted to do so according to an April 2010 opinion from the New York County Lawyers’ Association.

According to Opinion 742, New York adopted Rule 1.2 which allows “limited scope representation.”  Their Rule looks similar, if not identical, to Florida’s Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.2.  The ABA had some nice coverage as well.

The Opinion states that lawyers can play a “limited role” with informed (written) consent of the client without disclosing the involvement to the court or opposing party except if there is a rule, order or failure to do so constitutes misrepresentation (or triggers another ethical rule).  Even so, “disclosure” need not include the lawyer’s identity.

Need quick access to the Florida ethics rules?  Consider this.

Death of the Pure Bill of Discovery in Florida?

May 9th, 2010

Probably so, but not quite yet.

The case of Venezia Lakes Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Precious Homes at Twin Lakes Property Owners Assoc. (Third DCA: Suarez, Logoa, and Salter) reverses a trial court and remands with instructions to grant summary judgment on the grounds that a pure bill cannot be used to determine if a lawsuit exists.

In this case, two adjacent homeowners’ associations share expenses on one of two lakes.  Under the contract, Precious pays Venezia 30% of the expenses for one lake.  Typically, they get an approved budget with a single category, “lake budget,” which they believe may include expenses for both lakes — thus they may be overpaying.  When Precious asked for the service contracts which support the budget entry, they were refused.  They filed a pure bill of discovery to get those service contracts.

The Panel held that the pure bill of discovery’s “usefulness [has] diminished greatly” and quotes a swath of cases from the various intermediate appellate courts.  If there is no other remedy, it can be used to identify potential defendants, theories of liability, and information to meet conditions precedent to file suit.  But, in very vague terms, it “cannot be used as a fishing expedition to see if a case exists.”

Here, the court ruled that the pure bill does “not lie to see if a cause of action exists nor… [to determine] the extent of damages.”  Herein, the court suggested that alternative remedies were available including a declaratory judgment or breach of contract claim.

2010 SCOTUS: “Mojave Desert Latin Cross Case,” The Establishment Clause Case (That Wasn’t Really)

May 4th, 2010

The one thing that nearly all of the Justices agreed upon in the most recent church-state decision is that Ken L. Salazar, Secretary of the Interior et al. v. Frank Buono isn’t really an Establishment Clause case.  More critically, this may simply be confusing church-state decision which hints that some Justices may want to tinker with the various tests.

The Washington Post front page story described the plurality as a 5-4 decision wherein the “prevailing conservatives signal[ed] a broader openness to the idea that the Constitution does not require removal of religious symbols from public land.”

Justice Kennedy issued the Opinion (Alito and Roberts joined and wrote their own).   Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in a disappointingly dry few pages.  Justice Stevens (with Ginsburg and Sotomayor) wrote a dissent as did Justice Breyer.  So right there, with a 5-4 split and a retiring justice, we have some speculation as to what may happen in future cases.

This Opinion, which advances our understanding of the Establishment Clause in little to no degree, takes up a lot of paper.  We’ll do our best to keep our analysis concise.

Facts: in 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) put an eight foot cross on a rock out in the middle of the Mojave Desert in Southern California.  The purpose was to honor the fallen soldiers in WWI.  That cross sits on federal land.  Some people use the area for secular purposes (campground or remembrance of war heroes) while others use the area for sectarian purposes (Easter services).

A retired park ranger sued claiming the Christian cross violated the Establishment Clause.  He won at almost every turn.  However, Congress repeatedly stepped in to pass federal laws specifically directed at that one cross.  After winning the first injunction, the issue came down to whether  the Government could transfer the land to private ownership who would maintain it as a WWI memorial or risk ownership reverting back to the government.

The Opinion focuses fairly heavily on the underlying injunction however many of the other opining justices argue that this case is not an Establishment Clause challenge (i.e., can the government own land with a cross on it).  The fact that Congress “intervened” with statutes while this case was traveling up and down the federal court system, including the land-transfer statute at issue, complicates the true subject of the case.

Opinion (Kennedy/Roberts/Alito): the District Court applied the wrong standard in enjoining the government from implementing the land-transfer statute.  The trial court likewise “dismissed Congress’ motives as illicit” (more on this below) and “took insufficient account of the context… and reasons” for the  new law.

  • “Although certainly a Christian symbol, the cross was not emplaced on Sunrise Rock to promote Christianity.”
  • “The land-transfer statute embodies Congress’ legislative judgment that this dispute [over the cross on public land]… has complex meaning beyond the expression of religious views.”
  • “The goal of avoiding government endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm.”
  • “[The Establishment Clause]… leaves room to accommodate divergent values within a constitutionally permissible framework.”
  • “But a Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs.”

Concur (Alito): agrees with Kennedy but would not remand for lower court to decide whether land-transfer statute violates injunction or the Establishment Clause since factual record is “sufficiently developed.”  Congress’ statute resolved a “delicate problem” in “the spirit of practical accommodation.”  Removal would be seen as disrespectful to the soldiers the cross meant to honor.  It might also appear hostile to religion rather than neutral.

  • “[A]t least until this litigation, it is likely that the cross was seen by more rattlesnakes than humans.”

Concur (Roberts): Buono’s counsel agreed that the government could take down the cross, sell the property, and not violate the law.  ”I do not see how it can make a difference for the Government to skip that empty ritual and… sell the land with the cross on it.”

Dissent (Scalia/Thomas):  Buono’s standing to challenge the existence of the cross is not before the Court however the  question whether he has standing to challenge the land-transfer statute is for the Court’s consideration.  ”He has failed to allege any actual or imminent injury.”  Nothing in the statute requires the would-be private owners to keep up a cross, only the memorial.

Dissent (Breyer): the non-Establishment Clause question of whether the trial court can find the (subsequently enacted) land-transfer statute is within the scope of the original injunction.

Dissent (Stevens/Ginsburg/Sotomayor): the transfer of the land by the Government to private ownership would still violate the Establishment Clause (and the injunction) because a “reasonable observer” would conclude that the Government endorsed the cross and the sole purpose of the transfer was to preserve its display.

  • “The Establishment Clause… prohibits government from specifying details upon which men and women who believe… are known to differ.”
  • “Particularly important to this analysis is that, although the transfer might remove the implicit endorsement that presence on public land signifies, [...] it would not change the fact that the Government has taken several explicit actions to endorse this cross.”
  • “Congress singled out that cross for special treatment and it affirmatively commanded that the  cross must remain.”
  • “Making a plain, unadorned Latin cross a war memorial does not make the cross secular.  It makes the war memorial sectarian.”
  • “The days of considering the cross itself as challenged under the Establishment Clause are over; it is settled that the Government is not permitted to endorse the cross.”
  • “If the purpose of the transfer was to keep the cross in place, what was the purpose of keeping the cross in place?”
  • “Moreover, the inference that Congress has exercised its institutional competence — or even its considered judgment — is significantly weaker in a case such as this, when the legislative action was buried in a defense appropriations bill and, so far as the record shows, undertaken without any deliberation whatsoever.”

Conclusion?  Well, not a lot, other than confirming  the ongoing frustration that the Court has  not clarified church-state issues or the test(s) it wishes to use.  This case, arguably, is judicial venting of frustrations on various sides with no real conclusion — to wit, even the parties are sent back down to the lower court for more litigating.

There is some concern raised that turning the cross into a secular, or even “complex,” image as a clever method to install it in the public square undermines its sectarian value (see “What That Cross in the Mojave Desert Symbolizes“).  There is also some concern (raised in the dissent) that we have no WWI memorial… other than this “plain” cross.  Other concerns arise as well.  None are likely resolved, in this decision, to anyone’s satisfaction.

Appraisal Contingency Clause in Florida Real Estate Contract

April 30th, 2010

The Second District held that a clause allowing an “appraisal contingency” was valid which permitted the prospective buyer to back out of a contract without penalty.

The case is Nigel and Christine Gibney v. Randy and Helen Pillifant (LaRose, Villanti, Fu;mer).

The home sales contract was “contingent upon this property appraising for no less than $620,000 to be conducted by a local appraiser.”  Buyer performed an appraisal which came back under that amount.  Seller then requested an appraisal which was higher.  Who wins?

The panel held that “although inartful, this [clause] is not ambiguous” and that “appraising for no less than $620,000″ means that NO appraisal may be back less than that amount.  It was suggested that the sellers could have reserved the right to a competing, controlling appraisal.

CLaw iPhone App in Palm Beach Daily News

April 27th, 2010

The Palm Beach Daily News ran a nice story on the CLaw iPhone app which sets out Florida Rules of Professional Conduct as well as various federal and local bar rules which is free on iTunes.  

Article is here.

Check out the app via link at ClawApp.com.

New Florida Law “Repeals” (in part) Court Decision About Parents Signing Child Waivers

April 23rd, 2010

Commercial activity providers will soon be able to go back to having parents sign liability waivers for their children, once the Governor signs a new law passed by the Florida Legislature this week.  While the law facially curtails lawsuits, it has nonetheless been heralded as a “win” for trial plaintiff lawyers (don’t be fooled: it is good for defense lawyers to, since someone has to defend the cases).

The history of this issue started with a surprise 2008 decision from the Florida Supreme Court when it said in the Fields case that parents/guardians did not have the inherent authority to waive liability on behalf of children participating in commercial activity (e.g., motorcross, rides, boating, sports, safaris, etc.).  In 2009, spurred by Orlando theme parks, dive boat operators, motorsports venues and others, the Florida legislature tried but failed to pass a bill essentially “reversing” the court’s opinion.  See here for a brief overview.

The issue was revived again this year and it appears, from the coverage, that the bill succeeded due to a combined weakened perspective of the plaintiff bar and some concessions.

Senate Bill 2440 is here.  A solid history of the issues can be found in the staff analysis.

Highlights are:

* law amends Florida Statute 744.301 to allow parents/guardians to sign waivers releasing commercial activity providers from liability for injuries to children due to “inherent risks” (only)

* law creates a rebuttal presumption of no liability — it is not a bar to lawsuits nor it is grounds for a quick summary judgment

* many businesses have a hard time getting and maintaining the proper paperwork; the law requires certain releases with specific clauses or else it is invalid

* an attempt to make an overly broad release may invalidate the whole thing

* still no definition of a “commercial” vs. “noncommercial activity provider”

* law does allow “noncommercial activity providers” (whoever they are) total immunity under a valid pre-injury waiver

Florida New Slip and Fall Law July 1, 2010

April 19th, 2010

Governor Crist signed HB 689 into law, creating a mini tort reform change in the ongoing battle as to how slip and fall cases are handled in Florida.  A Google search reveals over 1,400 news stories on the issue but many get the story wrong and most fail to give the specifics.  Almost all of the coverage agrees that this favors business owners.  Let’s see if we can do better (and be concise):

* The current law, F.S. 768.0710, sets out the “reasonable care” standard and the claimant has the burden to show a duty and breach thereof.  Proof of actual or constructive notice of a transitory object is not required.

* The new law, effective July 1, 2010, repeals section 768.0710 and creates a brand new Florida Statute 768.0755, which includes a pro-business addition to the statute requiring a plaintiff to prove actual or constructive notice of a transitory substance which would then establish a breach of duty.

* My read, and I stand to be corrected, is that the new law applies only to actions which accrue (occur) on or after July 1.

* For those interested in the history of the bill and its twin, CS / SB 1224, see here.

* The twists and turns of the slip-and-fall battle date back to the 2001 Florida Supreme Court case of Owens v. Publix, which lead to the Legislature turnaround in 2002.  A solid recount of the flip-flopping is here.

I recall that there are alternate tort claims for slip and falls relating to warning and maintaining — any guesses as to whether this will apply to both methods of suing for a slip and fall?

We’re open for comments below.

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