Archive for the ‘Legal Ethics’ Category

Can You Post a Video Deposition on YouTube?

Monday, July 20th, 2009

The Internet has invigorated questions about depositions which has laid fairly dormant for years: who “owns” a deposition video or transcript?  Is it public record?

Ever considered posting a video deposition on YouTube?  Is that allowed?  A quick search suggests there’s more than two thousand video depos on YouTube.

We’re not impressed that these questions have been squarely answered but the Merrill Corporation has done a fairly tidy job summarizing the issue in their essay, “Is that Me on YouTube?  Ground Rules for Access, Use and Sharing of Digital Depositions.”

We won’t summarize Merrill’s work but add these thoughts:

1.  The Court likely does not “own” the deposition transcript/video but clearly has control over it.

2.  Filing the transcript/video in the court file makes it public record.  Filing it before using it elsewhere seems like a threshold step to avoid lengthy questions as to what is or is not public record.

3.  I’m not impressed with the idea the court reporter owns the transcript.  Again, there is little to no law on point but I think the requesting attorney hired the reporter for a job and gets the benefit of the work product.  I also mention that, under FRCP 30(f)(3), the reporter can be ordered who can get a copy.   That suggests the reporter plainly doesn’t own the transcript free and clear.

4.  The question of the right to distribute seems to come down to (a) is it filed with the court, (b) is there a danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency, (c) privacy interest of those resisting disclosure, and (d) nature/degree of injury to party if information is released.  Here in Florida, there is a trend towards more open invasive discovery and clamping down on the distribution of public record information seems counterculture to Florida legal theories and trends.

5.  Merrill notes some interesting potential privacy violations if the transcript includes HIPAA, drug, alcohol or mental health treatment.

6.  Merrill also casts a shadow over the practice of sharing expert deposition transcripts (for the reasons in #5) but cites no case or instance where that ultimately became a legal issue.

7.  Suggestions?  File the video or transcript with the court and, if you’re going to distribute on YouTube or elsewhere, consider distributing edited snipets.

Tivo Buys Bull, Wins Case..?

Wednesday, July 8th, 2009

Imagine trying a $100+ million dollar case in a small town.  Would it be appropriate for lawyers involved in such a case to try and win some goodwill in the community for their client before that case?  Or are we simply tying together two wholly separate incidents?tivo

Apparently Marshall, a town in east Texas, is a hotbed of infringement lawsuits.  TiVo, the DVR-provided, sued Dish Network there and reportedly bought a local girl’s champion bull before a competition.  The bull won and the lawyers gave the girl the money.  Sites like TechDirt, RapidTV News, and The Prior Art covered the story.

We’ve mentioned before the practice of a law firm editing their own website right before a trial to make them appear more experienced or focused on the subject matter of the lawsuit.  This isn’t necessarily contact with potential jurors (who aren’t supposed to be researching anyhow) but does make sense if the case gets media attention.  Buying livestock seems like an interesting notion too…

How Should A Judge Instruct A Jury Not to Text, Twitter or Google?

Wednesday, July 1st, 2009

Look no further than our brethren in Michigan, who hustled out a June 30, 2009 order providing the anti-Twittering jury instruction for trial judges.  The rule goes into effect in September.

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No, it may not be required here in Florida yet, but isn’t it a good idea?  Why not offer to the judge for your next trial?

Would the other side actually disagree?

The rule is here.  The Detroit Free Press article is here.

Lawyer Cannot Ask Paralegal to “Facebook Friend” A Witness

Tuesday, June 16th, 2009

After the flood  of attention which lawyers and the media have recently paid to social networking sites, the next logical emphasis will be the ethical use, and mis-use, of such sites by lawyers.

Trying to jump start that inquiry, in Internet Social Networking Sites For Lawyers, we hinted at the risks of Facebook-friend’ing prospective jury members (improper contact under Rule 4-3.5) and we raised concerns about the use of social networking sites being deemed as advertising violations (Rules 4-7 and 4-15).  Indeed, in a recent presentation, we even discussed whether a law firm could revise and tailor its website prior to trial.  We also proposed to a paralegal group that they could not anonymously send Facebook-friend requests to jury members.

But we were clearly not thorough nor quick enough.  The Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee hustled out its Opinion 2009-02 which held that a lawyer could not ask a “third person” (presumably a paralegal or office employee) to Facebook-friend a deposition witness so the lawyer could surreptitiously access the witness’ Facebook page.

For the uninitiated, the default setting on a person’s Facebook page is that only invited/permitted users can see the page.  To gain access, a user needs to send a “Facebook friend request.”  That request usually is accomplished by clicking a button which says “send Friend request.”   There is a discreet link which says “Send a Personal Message” where the pursuing user can enter a greeting or identification or some kind but, at least anecdotally, this is rarely used.  The receiving user can see the name, picture, and a brief description of the person sending the friend request.  That person can then “confirm” or “ignore” the request.  For a good summary of this process, look here.

Here, the lawyer believed the deponent had information on her web page and somehow believed she would accept just about anyone as a Facebook friend (presumably there was some discussion as to the number of Facebook friends or her Facebook practices).  In person, the lawyer did not ask to be a Facebook-friend.  Instead, the question was raised whether the lawyer could properly have a third person send the request — a person who the witness would likely not be able to identify as someone associated with the lawyer.  The obvious intention was that the Facebook-promiscuous user would blindly accept the friend request, thereby giving the lawyer access to the page.

The Philly Bar concluded that this was improperly deceptive under their Rule 8.4, which is nearly word-for-word identical to Florida Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-8.4.

First, the lawyer was responsible for the acts of the third person since the lawyer was asking for and ratifying the conduct.  Second, the lawyer was purportedly “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation… because the planned communication by the third party with the witness is deceptive [because] it omits a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who asks to be allowed access to the witness’ pages is doing so only because he or she is intent… on sharing it with the lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness.”

Unlike that Bar, we note that Facebook friend request typically do not involve an explanation / introduction and question whether this is truly “hiding” information.  Then again, in a non-virtual world example, a lawyer asking another person to cozy up to a witness at a bar to get information seems improper.  Your thoughts?  Comments welcome below.

“Paralegal Ethics” Presentation at PAF 2009 Seminar

Sunday, May 3rd, 2009

A special thank you to the Paralegal Association of Florida for their very kind invitation to speak at their 2009 Spring Seminar.  The topic was “Paralegal Ethics” and, after a brief discussion of Florida Rule Regulating the Bar 20-7, we dove into 10 different ethical scenarios.

pafThe Powerpoint used during the presentation can be found under “Materials” to the right side of this page.  Clicking on “2009 Paralegal Ethics” will allow you to save it on your computer.

These materials are free to use but, if you reproduce them, please give an acknowledgment.

If you have a comment from the presentation or on these paralegal ethic issues, please click on “Comment” below.

Florida Bar Sends Proposed Advertising Amendment to Florida Supreme Court

Sunday, April 5th, 2009

On April 1, no joke, it was reported that the Florida Bar sent to the Florida Supreme Court a proposed amendment to Bar Rule 4-7.1 which would allow lawyers to communicate (read: advertise) to former clients and other lawyers without meeting the usual advertising regulations.  Previously, the senior editor of the Florida Bar News opined that lawyers “aren’t concerned” about that type of regulation (“Attorneys Not Very Concerned About Lawyer-to-Lawyer Ads”).

The Court recently tossed out a Bar proposal to regulate websites; let’s see how this lawyer advertising de-regulation effort fares…

Second DCA Judge Accused of “Fiscal Shenanigans” (but not sex) With Stripper

Thursday, February 26th, 2009

The Tampa-area papers have quietly but persistently been following the story of Judge Thomas E. Stringer, Sr. of the Second District Court of Appeal who is in hot water with the Florida Judicial Qualifications Committee for hiding assets and other alleged mis-deeds with an aging stripper.  For those who need the salacious details with pictures of our judge and exotic dancer, see this St. Pete Times article.  

Apparently Hizzoner and our lady of the night met at a diner in Tampa and that turned into a relationship involving Hawaiian property, exotic cars as gifts, bankruptcies in Vegas, and Rolex gifts (we note that Ms. Yamanaka graciously gave one of the watches to Mrs. Stringer).  

Read the JQC’s Notice of Formal Charges.  Note the first paragraph (of course) has to point out that Yamanaka is an “exotic dancer” but then there is no mention of any sexual impropriety in the Notice.  The media dutifully took the bait.  The story has received national coverage because of the stripper-angle: note how the USA Today’s title, “Judge Accused of Sheningans With Stripper”  is a misleading  cheeky re-packaging of the local paper’s title, “JQC Accuses Judge of Fiscal Shenanigans.”  The omission of the word “fiscal” in the title makes a key difference, doesn’t it?

Non-Florida Lawyer (Who Advertises in Florida) Spent $20 Million on Ads

Thursday, February 26th, 2009

According to this ABA Journal article, Massachussets lawyer, James Sokolove, is the biggest spender on legal advertising in the country — including Florida, where his print ads intentionally only use basic block lettering.  He spent $20 million on advertising in 2007 alone.  In this Boston Magazine article that he prefers to spend downwards of $1,500 per tv ad rather than produce a higher quality ad — finding them both equally as effective.  

Despite his national advertising presence, including places like I-95 and the Florida Turnpike, Sokolove reportedly “no longer tries any cases” and, historically, “he’s argued only one case before a jury; it was back in the 1970’s and he lost.”  The articles cited above indicate that his firm is “keeping tabs on some 10,000 referred cases…” 

The Massachusetts Law Weekly Blog “The Docket” reported that Sokolove’s firm is for sale  despite the fact that “the assets would include virtually no attorneys as Sokolove refers the many calls his ads generate to a network of hundreds of other lawyers.”  

member search on the Florida Bar website did not reveal Mr. Sokolove is a Florida lawyer.   The Law Offices of James Sokolove, LLC is a Florida business entity but no Florida address is given.  A search on Sokolove’s website did not reveal a Florida office.

The Defense Lawyer Who Became a Plaintiff Lawyer

Thursday, February 26th, 2009

At the end of December, the Florida Supreme Court quietly laid to rest a nearly four year old squirmish between a defense-attorney-turned-plaintiff-attorney and his former nursing home client.  In doing so, after two trips to the Fourth DCA and one trip to the Supremes, we have an interesting swath of case law which clarifies the rules for lawyers moving firms, particularly from a defense firm to a plaintiff firm. 

The facts of the underlying case in  Peggy Bradley as Personal Representative of the Estate of Buford Allen Fennell v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America reveal a fairly standard nursing home lawsuit (ulcers and falls) arising from a January 2002 – September 2005 admission period.  Meanwhile, a West Palm Beach insurance defense lawyer worked for the defendant on similar cases at various times from February 2001 – December 2004.  It was introduced that the lawyer worked 2,100 hours for the former client in over 60 cases.  In January 2005, he switched law firms and became Plaintiff’s counsel.  The defendant moved to disqualify the lawyer and the Palm Beach Circuit Court denied the motion.

In Health Care v. Bradley I (December 2006),  the Fourth DCA, in a per curiam rehearing, held that the inquiry was whether Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.9 and 4-1.10 had been violated, specifically whether the pending matter was the “same or a substantially related matter” in comparison to the lawyer’s prior cases wherein he represented the defendant.  The Court noted there was an irrebutable presumption that confidences are disclosed in the course of the attorney-client relationship but disqualification of counsel was not required merely because of that irrefutable presumption.    

Upon remand, without further evidence, the trial court again denied the motion. 

In Health Care v. Bradley II (July 2007), the Fourth DCA (Gross, Shahood and Pollen) focused on the “substantially related” test and determined that the instant matter was not the “same” matter as counsel had previously defended.  Moreover, the case at bar was not “substantially related” to counsel’s prior defense work.  Despite the number of cases and hours worked for the former client, the Court felt that the prior cases did not involve the same transaction nor did the lawyer have to attack his prior work.  More succinctly, the Court found the lawyer had handled a “type of problem” for the defendant and then represented an adverse party in a “wholly distinct problem of that type.”  With that, the appellate court held that there was no error in denying the motion to disqualify.

The defendant appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, claiming a conflict with another intermediate district court opinion.  

In Health Care v. Bradley III, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that it had taken jurisdiction but then decided that it did not care that “jurisdiction was improvidently granted.”  Note: this is not the only case where the Florida Supreme Court changed its mind regarding jurisdiction on the eve of 2008.

Thus, the standard for disqualification under Rule 4-1.9 is a test of whether an attorney’s representation of a party adverse to a former client is the “same or substantially related” to counsel’s prior work for the former client, with little importance placed on the number of cases or hours previously worked.  Indeed, the “irrebutable presumption” standard suggests that it makes little difference if the lawyer had previously worked 100 or 1,000 hours for his former client — the narrow question of disqualification is whether the now-adverse-lawyer is working on the same or substantially related matter.

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